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Abstract 
Besides the influence of international experiences, the existing debate about implementing 
managed competition in Spain is grounded on MUFACE. MUFACE is an experimental public1y 
funded health care system, restricted lO civil servants and their dependants, that meets all the 
conditions of managed competition among insurers. 
This article tries to offer an analysis of sorne aspects of MUFACE. It includes fIrstIy a 
fonnalization of the incentives (a capitation) imposed to insurers and their optimal behaviour. 
Secondly, it tries to assess the existence of risk selection and other equally "perverse" practices, like 
what we cal1 service selection, in the presence of double insurance coverage. 
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INTRODUCTION 

Strong winds of refonn blow over the most developed countries'heaIth care systems. The 
forces most frequently mentioned have to do with a rather uncontrollable increase in heaIth care 
expenditure and no counterpart in tenns ofheaIth care output indicators (BIendon et al., 1991). 
" 
Sorne authors (Dreze, 1994) find in moral hazard the CnL"f: ofthe unresolved problem ofhealth 
care provision. Moral hazard problems are rooted in the behavior of both patients (demand side) and 
providers (supply side). On lile demand side, moral hazard is a problem as soon as an insurance covers 
aH kind of contingency and at any cost. On lhe sllpply side, many factors generate moral hazard 
problems. Among the most relevant \Ve mention cost-plus (retrospective) reimbursement rules that 
have traditionally dominated in insurance-provider relationship. 
As the root ofthe problem ofinefficient cost increase, the solutions may be viewed as coming 
towards either the demand, the supply, or both sides of the markets. Towards lhe demand side, the 
proposals that are most frequently mentioned would consist in increasing the insured participation in 
costs. But other kinds of non-monetary active participation of insured individuals in the decisions 
dealing with the provision could be considered, like widening choices of insured. If choice exists, 
moral hazard might then be reduced in the sense pointed out by López-Casasnovas (in Barbera, 1996): 
insured \ViII be forced to internalize their disappointrnents or disagreements about provision by just 
shifting provider, instead of making government responsible. Publicly financed health care systems 
have traditionally ignored these aspects of their health care system, in the name of paternalism and 
consumers'protection. However, as society grows more mature, better infonned and educated about 
health care, that paternalism becomes anachronic. Consumers \Vant to make choices and their o\Vn 
mistakes. 
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On the supply side. the literature proposes, as in the case ofthe demand side, to try to reach an 
optimal distribution of providers responsibilities in health care costs variations (Diamond, 1991, and 
Zeckhauser, 1970). In this search, the design and improvement of health providers'reimbursement 
systems are key elements. 
AH these proposals inelude ingredients ofmanaged competition. Indeed, managed competition 
places special emphasis on such elements as choice, competing providers and transfer of financial risk 
from the purchaser (government) towards insured and providers. Reforms in this sense are seen in 
rnany countries as "the means to pursue nirvana, in terms ofefficiency" (Maynard, 1994). One of the 
characteristics of this line of reform is that, in many cases, competition is preferably (Abel·Smith and 
Mossialos, 1994, and Hurst, 1991) set amongst providers that are vertically integrated and responsible 
for comprehensive care, like health maintenance organizations, GPFundholders, mutualities and 
insurers1• Regu!ated market structured this way is ver)' appealing to many policy makers. The reason is 
that that structure of regulated markets implies targeting final outputs (health status) rather than 
intermediate outputs (medica! activity), which is precisely one of the emphasis of public1y funded 
health care systems. And that may be the reason of the rapid success of these proposals. A second 
inherent characteristic ofthese models is that capitation is the reimbursement scheme chosen to transfer 
financial risk from the (public) purchaser towards providers. In fact, capitation constitutes one ofthe 
rnost important challenges of managed competition2• Most authors agree with Scheffier's idea 
1 \Ve will from no,," on talk of"insurers" when refening indistinctly lO insurers and !hird party purchasers ofheal!h careo 
.:z Other challenges sbould not be ignored, For example, a very inten:sting debate has recently becn open by Qouveia (1995) on !he elfects of 
compelilion, Gou\'eia assumes that technology plays !he role of pro\'iders'dilfen:ntiation, placing "!he degn:e of elfectiveness or technology as a 
second criterion for its use". He argues !hat "rather !han increasing welrare, competition may decrease it, lnsofar as !he gt'O\\1h in costs is not 
compensated byan increase in elfectiveness (oftechnology), which ls similar lO !he consequences of!he increasing monopoly modelo" A1so, Van de 
Ven (1995a) recalls !hat market-oriented reforms may improve efficiency bOl have not much lO do wi!h cost c:ontainment "in !he sense ofstabilizing 
'!he fi'aj:tion ofgross national product lO be spent on health care," Sorne others denounce that political and social structun:s of sorne countries may 
pI'O\<oke !he failun: of market-oriented reforms (Matsaganis, 1995), As many o!her ionovations, !he opening hea1!h care markets lO",ards managed 
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(Scheffier, 1989) that capitation represents the Achilles'Heels of managed competition refonns (pellisé 
, , 
I 
I1 i 
,1 
!, 
,1 
1/ , 
,! 
I 
2nd López·Casasnovas, 1992; Van de Ven, 1995b; Matsaganis and Glennerster, 1994). 
Managed competition has centered most of the attention of last decades refonners of health 
care, taking Enthoven's Consumer Choice Health Plan (Enthoven, 1986, 1980, 1990; Enthoven and 
Kronich, 1989), as the prototype. It constitutes the baseline of the refonns in the United Kingdom, the 
" 
Netherlands, Portugal, Chile, Denmark, Sweden, Ireland, New Zealand, the Russian Federation, Israel, 
•..and Spain. 
The ground for a possible refonn in Spain is MUFACE, an experimental health care system, restricted 
to civil servants and their dependents. lt is a health care sub-system within the Social Security System 
in Spain. The particularity of MUFACE is that it makes insurance carriers, including the public 
lNSALUD, compete for clients, by offering their health care plan and in exchange ofa fixed capitation 
fee. So, MUFACE makes up sorne fonn of managed competition. MUFACE is playing a key role in 
the debate around the design of the Spanish Health Care System of the future. It is under persistent 
political scrutiny but never rigorously analyzed. 
1t is in the analysis ofMUFACE that this research tries to make sorne contribution. We wiII by 
to do so by focusing on the distribution of risks between purchaser (govemment) and providers in a 
conteA"! of managed competition amongst insurance carriers. More specifically, it wiII place most of its 
attention onto capitation mechanisms which are the payment scheme usual1y implemented to reimburse 
compeling insurance carriers. The research is structured in three parts. The first one ineludes a 
description of MUFACE system. The second part tries to fonnally deduce insurer's behaviuor under 
MUFACE incentive scheme. That part represents an extension of a previous model (pellisé, 1994), 
competition is a sigo ofsuccess. It also implies!he need lO challenge the consequences ofits mm success, though: \Ve bener gel lO kno\\' weaknesses 
.and limitations ofthe model. 
3 
wbicb was an application 0fLaffont and Tirole's (1993) fonnalization on incentives in procurement 
Finally, section three shows some empirical assessment of some of the concIusions reached in the 
fonnalisation, like the existence of risk selection. 
l. MUFACE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE SPANISH HEALTH CARE 
SYSTEM. 
Figure 1 graphically represents the MUFACE system. MUFACE stands for "Mutua de los 
Funcionarios de la Administración Central del Estado". It is a governmental institution, responsible for 
contracting out the health services of Spanish civil servants (around 700,000 in 1993) and their 
dependants (about 900,000). The rest of Spaniards (around 38.5 million) get health services through 
the general system of the Social Security, the INSS (National Institute of the Social Security), by 
means ofthe only public provider. the INSALUD (National Institute for Health). MUFACE system is 
a special Social Security regime, applicable only to civil servants and their dependants. Both this 
special regime for civil servants and the general regime for the rest of Spaniards cohabit in the Social 
Security system. 
[Figure 1, bere] 
Within MUFACE system, MUFACE is a governmental institution that plays the role of just a 
regulator bearing no financial risks. Its revenue is basically a proportion of the public budget, made up 
of¡ncome taxes (general budget) and employees (the State) and civil servants'contributions. MUFACE 
allocates its own resources for health care to a diversity of insurance carriers who are willing to supply 
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health care services to MUFACE's enrolees, on a capitation basis. As a consequence, MUFACE does 
not really bear any financial risk. Figure 1 b shows these main financiaJ flows ofMUFACE3• 
[Figure 1b, heret 
One ofthe contracted insurance carriers is the public National Institute ofHealth (INSALUD), 
the same institution that provides health care services to the rest of Spaniards. But, while the Iatter have 
only this option, MUFACE enrolees can nowadays choose among the INSALUD and other (private) 
insurance carriers willing to participate in the MUFACE system. It is worth noting that, before 1977, 
MUFACE did not contract INSALUD, letting MUFACE enrolees choose among prívate carriers onJy. 
In the beginning of 1993, ten private companies chose to enter into a one year contract with MUFACE. 
ASISA and PREVIASA are t\\'o examples ofthem. They have about the same organisational structure 
as a Health Maintenance Organisation, and are required to offer at least the same coverage as the public 
agenc)' INSALUD offers to the rest ofSpaniards. 
Civil servants choose an ínsurance carrier once ayear (during the month of January), for 
themse1ves and their dependants. It is not an individual decision, that is, the hoJe family unít must 
choose the same carrier. Last January, 85% of the enrolees selected private carriers, and only 15% 
preferred the public agency INSALUD. Carriers are reimbursed a flat capitation fee, for each civil 
servant or dependant they have enrolled. The amount ofthis fixed fee is equal to the per capita public 
health care expenditure incurred by the INSALUD on aH its covered popuJation. that is on both the 
15% ofMUFACE enrolees who chose this agency and the rest (around 39 millíons) ofSpaniards. 
3The Gen=l Regime of!.he Social Security funding in 1992 \\'as as follo\\'s: employees COnlnouted in 3.80/... employers in 19.6% and!.he State, 
tbrough general taxation, in 76.5% (DGAPS, 1994). So, !.he employee contribution \Vas much bigher in Ihe case ofcivil servants !han in !.he case of 
"mers in Ihe Gen=l Reginte of!.he Social Security. 
4The concept "OIher re\"enues· includ~s e:-.1raordinary revcnues (1.5%), transfers from Ihe State (deficil, 8.1%), and wbat Ihe administration calls 
-cwnulaxi\'e exced~nt &om pre\"ious years" (due State contributions), 30.7%. 
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MUFACE makes ¡nsuranee earriers, including the publie lNSALUD, compete for clients, by 
offering their health care plan and in exchange of a fixed capitation fee. By placing earriers fully at risk 
and entitling enrolees to ehoose, MUFACE rnakes up sorne form of internal market. For this reason, it 
appeals to many health care s~stem reformers. However, it also concerns rnany others, rnainly for two 
reasons. First, it is an "unfair" privilege, sinee 1.5 million peopJe can ehoose among insurance carriers 
while 39 million cannot, with no extra charge. This argument puts pressure on the government to 
terminate the MUFACE experimento Second, it is felt that private carriers have "attraeted" all the good 
risks, pushing bad risks into the public agency. In other words, the critics of MUFACE's internal 
market believe that this has created risk selection problems. 
JI. FORMALIZATION OF MUFA CE INCENTIVE SCHEME. 
Our formalization focuses on the contractual relationship between the reguJatory institution 
represented by MUFACE and health care plans offered insurers earriers (including both lNSALUD 
and private kinds of carriers). The centre of our attention is thus the upper half part of figure 1. More 
specificalIy, \Ve are interested in rnodelling the response of insurers to the contractual arrangements set 
up in MUFACE. \Ve will firstly offer the main ingredients and assumptions of our modelization, and 
will then show the resulting optimal behaviour ofinsurers, given the incentive scheme. 
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JI. A THE ASSUMPTIONS. 
JI.A.! The incentive scheme. 
In our analysis of MUFACE system, we consider insurance carriers (either public or prívate) 
as procured agencies. Each carrier's yearlv per capita revenue (AR, paid by MUFACE) ¡s, by 
definition, a fixed amount of money per enrolee that, on a yearly basis, has chosen it to provide health 
services. Consistently with Laffont and Tirole's conventions, we define that revenue as the linear 
surnrnation of annual health care costs C and a net transfer 1, per enrolee, 
AR=C+I. (1) 
The net transfer t defined by MUFACE is derived from the general form, 
t =a- bC (2) 
The parameter b is a portion (O<b<l) of realised costs that is reirnbursed by the regulator 
under the form of a net transfer. The value ofthis parameter defines the incentive power of the payrnent 
scheme, or, in other words, its degree of prospectivity. In MUFACE's environment, this parameter 
takes the extreme value of l. 
With b = 1, the net transfer equals t= a-C, and carriers'average revenue AR =C+t =a. This 
kind of contract implies that insurers'average revenue has no relationship with realised costs. Such 
reimbursement scheme is usually calledjixed-price or prospective. It places insurance carriers fully at 
risk for any fluctuation in realised costs, whether they are justifiable or not. Consequently, it is totally in 
carriers'interest to make their best endeavour to rninirnize average costs. 
The parameter a is a fixed fee, ¡ndependent from realised costs C. MUFACE has defined this 
parameter as the level ofthe capitation payment. 
'. 
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a=z +1, (3.a) 
where 1 is the fNSALUD per capita expenditure for all its covered population. In fact, 1 is the 
fNSALUD average expenditure not only on MUF ACE enrolees (15% of 1.5 miUion enrolees), but also 
on the rest of (non-MUF ACE) Spaniards covered by the so-called general system of the Social 
Security (99% ofthe almost 39 million \Vho are neither civil servant nor dependants). 
AII together, the net transfer becomes: 
l=a-C 
t z - (C-/), (3.b) 
showing that the net transfer paid to prívate insurers is positively related to any cost saving attained, 
when compadng theír own average costs to those ofthe INSALUD. 
II.A.2 Information asvrnrnetrics. 
\Ve assume that there is a problem of asymmetric information bel:\veen MUF ACE and 
insurance carriers. MUFACE cannot observe the cost-reducing effort made by carriers, nor that part of 
systematic variation in cost that is due to sorne characteristics oftheir demands (health status). At most, 
the regulator may veritY an aggregate measure ofcosts. 
The first source of these mentioned information asymmetries is the moral hazard factor, and 
the latter the adrerse selection factor. 80th factors determine the systematic variation of costss. As 
defined by Ellis (1987), this latter factor is representative of the prospect "that certain facilities may 
systematically receive high- or low- cost patients". Other authors term this variation in cost Unot 
controllable" (Manton et aL, 1989), "justifiable" (Keeler, 1990) or "palient- or provider- specific" 
(Ellis and McGuire, 1988). 
5 Random variations in cost are omined for notational simplicit.y.lndeed, Iheir inclusion does nOl change anyoflhe fmdings. 
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Insurance carriers'cost function is assumed to be separable in production and asymmetric 
infonnation variables. Leaving the production variables unchanged, we define the total cost function as 
Te = (fJ - e)n +K, (4) 
where jJ is usually referred to as the adverse selection parameter of the carrier. It is a very relevant 
ingredient ofthe model which will be analysed in-depth later on. e is the cost-saving effort per enrolee, 
n fue number of enrolees who have chosen that company and K a fixed cost (which we set to zero for 
notational simplicity). 
Let e be the average cost per enrolee (e =jJ - e). MUFACE cannot observe effort but knows 
that: (a) \Vhen effort is raised, costs decrease, at a decreasing rate (ee<O and eee"20); and, (b) Effort 
generates disutility to insurer carriers. Let \}f(e) be the disutility function ofeffort, \}f'(e»O and \}f"(e»O. 
MUFACE is aware ofthis relationship. 
MUFACE offers al! insurance carriers that are able to offer a hea1th care plan that is 
comparable to INSALUD's the possibility of participating in MUFACE. They are free to do so, but 
they will accept the deal ir, and only if, they are guaranteed a minimum level of expected utility (the 
reservation utiJity level). We are thus assuming individual rationality. \Ve normalize the level of 
I 
I 
I 
reservation utility at zero. Any level above that will be called the carrier's "rent" or "surplus". 
Insurers are risk neutral and care only about their income and effort. We can write the firm's 
utiJity function as U = 1- \}f(e). 
I 
I I1.A.3 The adverse selection parameter. 
1 
I 
/1 
il 
The debate on risk selection often surrounding reforms containing sorne fonn of managed 
competition and capitation payments in Spain suggests the convenience of considering more than one 
scenario regarding insurers'specific costs. Indeed, every time the possibility of transfonning the 
1I 
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Spanish National Health System ¡nto a National Insurance System has been debated in the polítical 
aren~ the argument of risk selection has caught most of the attention. The mainspring of MUFACE 
detractors'argument has been the feeling that in the MUFACE experiment, prívate carriers have 
managed to "skim the cream", in the sense empirically assessed in similar scenarios byNewhouse 
(1982 and 1984) and Pauly (1984) for the American Medicare context, by Van de Ven and Van Vliet 
(1990) for the Dutch, and by Scheffler (1989) and Matsaganis and Glennester (1994) for the British 
context. This argument implicitely assumes that f1 is an endogenous variable to the insurance carrier. 
That is insurers play an active role in an incidental determination of justifiable costs through their 
selection of enrolees. Insurers optimize their pool of risks according to enrolees' expected yearly cost, 
in the same way an investor in a financial market would optimize its portfolio according to expected 
retums and risk. 
However, risk selection in MUFACE has never been assessed empirically. As a consequence, 
prívate insurers stick to the position that either there are no systematic differences in cost (jJ is uniform, 
on average, across all carriers), or that any difference in cost is exogenously determined 
(heterogeneous but exogenous). They argue that, ifany difference among insurers ever existed, it is due 
to reasons such as the historical origín ofthe insurance (inherited organisational structure), its location, 
or statutOI)' restrictions (Iike reJigious goals). These sources of justifiable cost variation are exogenous 
to the agents'behaviour (in the short run at least), and independent of whether the agent signs up the 
contract with MUFACE or not. 
The scenarios where f1 is uniform or heterogeneous but exogenolls have already been treated 
elsewhere (pellisé, 1994). It was then shown that, given the exogeneity and heterogeneity of risks 
faced by insurers, one should expect a problem ofpre-contractual selfselection (or adverse selection) 
among insllrers. That ¡s, MUFACE as a regulatoI)' agency should not expect to find "bad risks" among 
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its contracted prívate ínsurers, as long as individual rationality and free participation are binding 
constraints. 
The scenario we are dealing with in this paper have to do with ajJ that is endogeneous. We will 
here assume that variations in 'Justifiable" costs jJ are endogenously detennined by insurers. That is, 
insurers may optimize theír own poól of risks jJ by "attracting" good risks (healthy enrolees) and 
·'avoiding" bad risks (unhealthy enrolees). Under this assumption, we are extending Laffont and 
TiroJe's formulation (Laffont and Tirole, 1993). Both scenarios (that presented in Pellisé, 1994, and 
mis one presented now) and corresponding results are complementary. They couId in fact have been 
tested together. But not only would this have been more cumbersome, but aIso, their separation does 
not imply any loss ofinfonnation and rather greatly simplifies the fonnalization. 
II.A.4 Other rclatcd aspccts ofinsurers' bchaviour. 
1) We group prívate insurers together under a unifonnjJ. This simplification is possible ifwe 
consider that all prívate carríers play with unifonn rules and if we want to concentrate on the 
endogenous aspects of jJ (leaving the exogenous aspects unchanged). E(fJ¡} = BI and E(fJzJ = B] 
represent the expected values of MUFACE enrolee-specific costs (health status) ofprívate insurers and 
lNSALUD, respectively. 
2) We will assume that risk selection is undertaken by private insurers. The INSALUD has a 
rather passive attitude (defensive at most) towards this selection. This attitude could be justified by the 
]ow weight that MUFACE enrolees represent in the total population attended by INSAL,UD, by the 
retrospective aspect ofINSALUD reimbursement scheme, or by its public ownership. 
Let E(fJ)=B represent al1 MUFACE enrolee-specific costs. MUFACE enrolees distribution of 
J1] is comparable to that ofjJ for the rest ofSpaniards. In other words, MUFACE enrolees have a health 
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status that is comparable to that of the rest Spaniards. Moreover, we assume that, if no risk selection 
were undertaken, then the hazard functions offl of (i) all INSALUD enrolees (from MUFACE or not), 
of(ii) MUFACE beneficiaries altogether, only ofCiii) those MUFACE enrolees in INSALUD and only 
of(iv) those in private carriers are all comparable for any given vaIue offl. This implies the assumption 
that ex-ante (i.e. without risk selection), individuals are evenIy distributed according to their health care 
needs across the multiple providers ofthe Social Security. 
3) \Ve will consider thatfl represents a monetary measure ofunhealthiness. A highfl individual 
is an unhealthy individual, and a lowfl individual is a healthy one. Usually, health care expenditure is 
lognormally distributed. Assuming there is a continuum offl in the interval [JJ/.¡fl¡.J, thenfl, as well as 
}JJ andfll without risk selection, are distributed 
fl - Lognormal (B, el). 
4) In contrast, if risk selection is undertaken, private carriers distribution of their fl is not the 
distributionjust defined anymore. In fact, risk selection truncates the upper tail ofthe distribution offll 
that private carriers would otherwise have without risk selection. 
A first step in risk selection would be to "get rid of' the most expensive patient flH in the 
interval [JJ/.¡fl¡.¡} of possible patients. Subsequent steps, fol1owing risk selection practices, would consist 
in progressively "get riskl! of lower thanflH patients. Let's r¡ denote the healthiest enrolee affected by 
private carriers'selection, conditional upon allfl that preferred a private provider in the interval1r¡/JHl 
did already suffer from selection. It is worth noting that as r¡ decreases risk selection becomes more 
severe. 
As a consequence of risk selection, the distribution of private plansj3 becomes a truncated 
distribution for any value of fl greater 01' equal to r¡. Hence, the resulting mean of private 
carriersJustifiable costs is 
12 
E(J3, 1ft, <r¡} =BI =E(J3) - O' A.I (a), (5) 
with a =(rJ - E(J3)) / 0', (6) 
A.¡{a) = $(0.) / <1>(0.) , (7) 
and, E(J3) =B. 
$(0.) and <1>(0.) are standard probability density and cumulative distribution functions, 
" 
respectively. For notational simplicity, we will, in what follows, use $ and <1> to refer to $(0.) and 
lP(a), respectively. 
5) When unhealthy beneficiaries (with highft values) are "excJuded" from private insurers, the 
public INSALUD in MUFACE takes care of them. The distribution of the systematic costs function 
due to this group of"selected" beneficiaries yields, on their own, an expected value offt like 
(8) 
with 0.= (r, - E(J3)) / 0', 
1-:/0.) = $(0.) / (J - <1>(0.)) , (9) 
and, E(JJ) =B. 
6) Expected costs ofINSALUD are l. These costs are a weighted average ofthe expected costs 
oft\\'o groups of enrolees: (i) those who would be attended by INSALUD when no risk selection is 
undertaken (coming from MUFACE and also the rest of generally covered by INSALUD), and (ii) 
those who are "excluded" from private carriers. The expected costs of the former group of enrolees is 
Ef13) = B, according to ingredients defined in point 3 and 4. And the expected costs ofthe latter groups 
is E(fJ, 1ft, ~ r¡j, as defined in equations (8) and (9). 
The weight ofthe "excluded" individuals over aIl enrolees attended by INSALUD is fl=(l­
lP)s . .e (~l)equals the proportion of MUFACE enrolees choosing private carriers (without risk 
selection) over the rest of individuals (not necessarily from MUFACE) attended by INSALUD. And 
13 
I I 
(1-<1» is the probability that beneficiaries choosing a private carrier falI within the "excluded" group of 
enrolees. This probability equaIs zero when no risk selection is undertaken, increases with risk 
selection, and. hence. decreases with r¡. 
Taking (8) and (9) into account, 
E(J3¿) =(1-~) E(J3) + ~ E(J3¡ /fi¡ ~ r¡} 
" 

:::;> E(J3¿) =(1-~) E(J3) + ~ B + ~ O' {~(a) / (1- 4>(a)j 

:::;> E(f3¿) =B + ~ O' (~(a) / (1 - 4>(a)) 
(10) 
Consequently, the expected cost function ofINSALUD becomes 
1 =E(f3¿) - é = B + E (1-4» O' "2(a) - é 
:::;> 1 =Í + E (1-4» O' Ala). (11) 
with Í =B - é. (12) 
and é being the effort that INSALUD exerts. Morebver. since, 
E(J3) =B =4> E(J3¡ /fi¡ <rJ +(1-4» E(J3¡ /fi¡ ~rJ, 

then, equation (11) may be equalIy interpreted under the form 

(13) 
7) Risk selection inflicts disutility to private carriers. FirstIy, because there is the possibility that 
a patient is detected as having been selected out by a prívate carríer. In such a case, the responsible 
carrier is urged 10 reimburse INSALUD full health care costs. Secondly, because there is also the 
possibnity that an insurer carrier might be denied future deals with MUFACE because of risk selection 
practices. This punishment has never been put into practice. The former compensation to INSALUD 
for risk selection is rather frequent in MUFACE. In 1992, 8.3 enrolees out of 100.000 in MUFACE 
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suffered from "extraordinary switches". Each of these cases did not cost less than 1.5 million Pesetas. 
(DGAPS, 1993). This is the kind ofrisk selection cost we will try to formalize here. 
\Ve call p the probability (0<pS.1) that a selected individual (in the interval [r¡,ft¡J) is detected, 
and whose health care costs have to be reimbursed by private carriers to the public INSALUD. Given 
equations (8), (9) and (12), the expected full cost private carriers should pay back to INSALUD is 
pC·=p[E(f3¡ /p¡~r¡}-é] (14) 
This expected cost function is increasing with r¡ (with cr(pC)/ar¡>O ). In other words, 
equation (14) is decreasing (and convex) with risk selection. Let's take an extreme example. An 
insurance carrier starts selecting. 'l'he first selected individual is the most expensive one, with P=PH' 
Let's assume for a moment that INSALUD detects this selection with probability p=l. In such a case, 
that private carrier has to pay back INSALUD the cost of attending this patient, which is the highest 
cost CH=PH - é. This is the cost defined by equation (14) for the special highestft case. If that 
insurance carrier kept on selecting, further costs to be paid back to INSALUD would be lower. 
From that extreme example, one may infer that equation (14) gives a misleading approach to 
the disutility ofselection. ActualIy, it just defines the expected per capita cost of "excluded" individuals 
that have been detected by lNSALUD. It does not define its impact on private carriers expected total 
cOS!, and, consequently, on their net transfer. But that impact is what really matters to carriers. 
In order to capture that impact, \Ve need define the disutility ofeffor! as a function of the share 
of"seJected" individual over the rest of individuals among which the costs of selection have to be spilt 
overo Taking (14) and this spill over effect into account, the resulting disutiJity from risk seJection 
(~(r¡}) becomes 
~(r¡)=p [(1-(/))!<D] C· 
~(r¡)=p [(1-(/))/(/)][ B +(j A.2 (a)), 
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t;(r¡} = p [(J-<P)!<P] j +P cr (~(a)!<P(a), 
or, t;(r¡} =p [(l-<P)!<P] j +P cr A¡{a.). (15) 
The weight [(J-<P)!<P] accounts for how rnuch the unselected individuals (whose probability is 
[1- <P]) are bound to bear because ofthe carrier selecting sorne individuaIs. whose probability is <P 
and whose full health care costs wiII háve to be paid back with probability p to INSALUD. This weight 
tends to zero when no risk selection is undertaken. It equals one when half ofthe individuaIs choosing 
private carriers are selected out. And tends to infinite when all índividuals are selected out. 
8) The net transfer to prívate carriers \Vas defined by equation (3a) and (3b), t¡ = z - (C­
1). where 1 is the average (per capita) expenditure ofINSALUD on MUFACE enrolees and on the rest 
ofSpaniards. 
With all the ínformation offered by equations (5) to (15), the net transfer equation of private 
carriers becornes 
t¡ =z-(C-I) 

IJ =z- fB - cr[9!<P] - e¡} + {B+ f.(l- <P)cr[$!(l-<P)] - é} 

tJ =Z + cr I.¡(a) [ 1 + f. <P] + (er é). (16) 

U.E THE PROGRAM OF PRIVA TE CARRIERS. 
Private carriers utility is a function of the net transfer (t¡) less the disutility of risk selection 
(t;(r¡}) and the disutility ofeffort ",(e¡}, 
VJ =lJ - t;(r¡} - ",(e¡} 

VJ =Z + cr t.¡{a) [ 1 + f. <P] + (er é) -p [(l-<P)I<P] j -p cr A¡{a) 

V, =z + cr t.¡{a) [1 + E<P -p] -p [(J-<P)I<P] 1 + (eré) - ",(e). (17) 
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\Ve impose a constraint over the optimization program of insurers consisting in requiring that 
any additional risk selection is undertaken only if it brings to insurers equal or greater net transfer than 
disutility. This restriction implies that individual rationality prevails under risk selection. The fonu of 
this restriction is 
fj 'A¡{a) [1 + f,<1> -p]?p [(1-<1»/<1>] l. 
Note that 'A¡{a) = $(0.)/<1>(0.) is the hazardfimction for the distribution of enrolees remaining 
in private carriers, after risk selection has taken place. 'A¡{a) may be interpreted as the probability that 
no moreJ3¡ are less than r¡. given thatJ3H- r¡ (in the interval fJJdl¡IJ have already been selected out. As 
this probability rises, a greater proportion of unhealthy individuals has been successfully skimmed by 
private carriers. 
This hazard function has positive slope and is convex with respect to risk selection, and 
negative slope with respect to r¡. High risk selection undertaken, corresponds to a higher values ofthe 
hazard functions. 
Finally, the program ofprivate insurers becomes, 
Ma.x UJ =z + cr !.¡(a) [1 + f,<1> -p] -P [{1-<1>)I<1>] 1+ (e¡- é) - 'V(e) 
subjected to cr !.¡(a) [1 + f,<1> -p]?p [(1-<1»/<1>] 1 
n.e THE SOLUTIONS. 
The solutions to private carriers'program are: 

'V'(e) = J (18) 

P[(Ucr)(9/<1>])] + f,91/<1> =cr r:;¡{a) (J + f,<1> -p] (19) 

with r:;¡{a) =8p.¡{a)}laa ='A¡{a) [A.¡{a) + a] 
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According to equation (18), effort reaches, at the optimum, the IeveI of complete information 
conditions, since insurers are residual claimants ofany cost savings due to effort. 
The right hand side 01equation (19) are the marginal net benefits in terms of increased net 
transfer to private carriers by a marginal decrease of rJ, or, in other words, due to the reduction of the 
truncation point ofthe distribution ofprivate carriers'fl. These net benefits are threefold. 
FirstIy, net transfer is increased as a result of decreasing private carriers'own costs. This is 
equivalent to the marginal decrease ofthe truncation point oftheirfl distribution, as r/ increases. Private 
carriers get aIl the benefits from such a reduction in cost because the capitation payment places them as 
full residual claimants. Secondly, by decreasing the truncation poin!, the portion ofINSALUD's costs 
due to MUFACE beneficiaries that have suffered selection (E<l» makes INSALUD average costs 
increase by E<l>/...¡{CX}. This increase in INSALUD costs produces an increase in the net transfer to 
private carrier through equation (10). And, finalIy, marginal net benefits are obtained by detracting the 
marginal costs of selecting out. These are a portion p of the gross marginal benefits of truncating 
prívate carriers'own costs (c:;¡{cx}). 
Tlle lefi hand side 01equation (19) are the marginal spill-over effects of observing a greater 
amount individuals coming form private carriers on to the public INSALUD, due to risk selection 
instead of e.'<:-ante choice of carrier. Theses affects are twofold: (i) on the average disutility of effort 
{p[(I1(J)(~/(Jl)J}, and, (ji), on the average costs of INSALUD (I) that are used as reference of the 
transfer function t (E~2/(J)}. 
These results are worth three cornments. Firstly, they satisfy the sufficient conditions of a 
maximum with respect to r/. Annex 1shows the properties ofthe second derivative implying so. 
Secondly, the constraint is not binding at the optimum, as shown in annex 2. As a 
consequence, we derive the following proposition 1: 
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Given an optimal level ofnet transfor under no risk selection environments, i.e. Ihal would 
leave no renls under exogenolls fl scenarios, Ihe endogeneity offl makes insurance carriers capture 
positive renls when risk selection is optimized eonsequenlly, from the regulator stand-point, if the 
regularor accepts the existence ofrisk selection, he cOl/Idpayprivate carriers a lower nel transfor (as 
compared to thar paid under exogenolls risk poolsJ, up to the point where individual rationality 
condltions wouldstill be satisfied 
Thirdly, those results may be extended for a net transfer such as 
t, =z- b (e -1), 
where the degree ofthe incentive scheme b (05':.b5.J) is not constrained to be equal 10 one. Under these 
general conditions, the results ofthe insurance carriers'program yields: 
\jI'(e) =b 
p[(Ucr)(~/(fl)} + b 8f/<1> = cr c,¡{a) [b (1 + 8<1» -p} 
This program provides the following proposition 2: 
Besides the relevance ofp. the degree of the incentive power of tl1e capitation payment is 
equally relemnt in determining carriers'risk selection behm'iollr. JVith b < 1 we \fould have, at the 
optimuln. an effort 101l'er than the complete information effort, but proportionally less risk selecHon: 
lf11ile benejits ¡roln selecting gel lower, the disutility remains Ihe same.eonsequently, given Ihe 
el1dogenolls characteristic ofrisk pools, sorne rents cOl/Id be extracledfrom private carriers byeither 
cbanging the degree ofprospectivity ofthe level ofthe capitation payment, or by setting a capitarion 
pa)'ment Iower Ihan Ihar resulting from an exogenolls risk pool scenario, withollt violaling the 
individual rationality constrainl. 
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III. SOME EMPIRICAL IN-SIGHTS. 

One of the most important implications of the fonnalization offered previously is that one 
should expect to observe risk ~election problems in MUFACE. In fac!, this is exactly what detractors of 
MUFAC~ more strongly argue against its extension to all Spaniards. In this part ofthe research \Ve 
would like to offer sorne empirical in-sight into MUFACE's e1ection ofinsurance carrier. 
The main challenge faced along our empirical assessment ofthe incentives set up in MUFACE 
is related to the data. Trying to detect risk seIection practices requires detecting that systematicalty 
Jo\Ver than average cost patients choose private carriers and relatively more expensive patients choose 
INSALUD. However, this is preciseIy the kind of infonnation that has not been provided by neither of 
the carriers participating in MUFACE nor MUFACE ¡tselE For that reason, \Ve needed to carry on the 
rest of the analysis on the grounds of indirect infonnation on costs. Sorne sociodemographic indicators 
have shown to be correlated to individual health expenditure (Newhouse, 1986; Anderson et al., 1986; 
Van de Ven, 1990). This is the case of age, sex, income, education, supply (which may induce 
demand), and so on. \Ve have used those links to offset the lack ofinfonnation on direct costs ofhealth 
careo 
\Ve base our analysis on the grounds of three sources of infonnation someho\V related to 
MUFACE. The first one is 1992 data contained in MUFACE's files related to its covered civil servants 
and dependents. The second and third relate to those who reported sorne relationship with MUFACE in 
the Spanish Households Budget Survey (HBS) of 1991 and in the National Survey on Health (NSH) of 
1993, respectively. 
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lilA A FIRST GLANCE AT THE DATA SETS. 
The debate about extending MUFACE to all Spaniards is usualIy centered on risk selection 
problems. Detractors of MUFACE believe that there are important risk selection problems, while 
prívate carriers disagree (A&S·Economía y Salud, 1993). Private carriers support their argument on the 
" 
only comprehensive information on MUFACE enrollees: MUFACE's data bases. Unfortunately, that 
data base includes information on age, sex, residence and choice of insurance carrier6 only Private 
carriers argue that there is evidence on the relative preference of the elderly for prívate carriers, 
contradicting the hypothesis ofrisk selection. 
MUFACE otTered us information on a sample of around 42,000 civil servants and their 
dependents. \Ve found out that, while there is no significant ditTerence by sex or residence, the elder 
tend to prefer a private carrier. Indeed, the weight ofelderly is more important in private insurers (11 %) 
than in INSALUD (6%). Figure 2 shows sorne insight into the age distribution ofbeneficiaries among 
carriers. 
[Figure 2, here] 
These findings do contradict the hypothesis of risk selection. However, one shouJd be cautious 
about considering them a necessary nor sufficient condition. Firstly, because, given the usual per capita 
costs concentration curves, carriers need only to "skim the cream" of sorne few (say 5%7) highest 
spenders to save a large part (around 50%) of its costs. This means that: (i) using proxies as age give a 
very rough feeling of risk sdection practices, and (ii), as pointed out by Newhouse (1986), untess very 
6 This is the only information MUFACE gathers aboUl their insured 
, Figtttes e~;tl'acted from!he spanish public mutuality-PAMEM (1992). 
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large samples are used, risk selection is hard to detect because of that skewness in the distribution of 
capitated average costs. 
Secondly, because of two institutional features related to MUFACE and which make that 
managed competition peculiar and risk se!ection harder to be detected. The first peculiarity is that, as 
we pointed out in the first section, INSALUD was not an available option for MUFACE enrollees until 
1977. Loyalty in the choice ofhealth care plans is quite strong (Neipp and Zeckhauser, 1985) mainly 
because ofhigh information costs ofshifting. Ifthese costs may make intemal markets in health hardly 
competítive per se, the problem worsens for those providers entering later in the market. This 
phenomenon has similarly been assessed in Medicare, by Luft (1982), Berenson (1986) and Van de 
Ven and Van Vliet (1995) in The Netherlands. Luft refers specifically to the case where a new provider 
enters the market, like INSALUD in the MUFACE system. He poínts out that people with existing tíes 
to a physician may be less willing to try a new delivery system and that such people are probably less 
healthy. 
Indeed, loyalty probably is an important issue in understanding the persistence of choice of 
provider in MUFACE. For example, civil servants working at the Ministry ofHealth used to be offered 
only ASISA in the past (before 1977). Loyalty could then explain why the vast majority (81.7%) of 
civil servants at the Ministry ofHealth remain in ASISA even in 1993 
The second peculiarity about MUFACE's managed competition is reJated to what we wiII call 
double insurance. Even if it is not always legal1y correet, there remains the possibility for sorne 
MUFACE beneficiaries ofhaving a simultaneously two public heaIth care coverages: that offered by 
MUFACE, and that offered by the more general system ofthe Social Security. 
If double insurance were true, there would be the possibility that unhea1thy individuals in 
MUFACE tend to choose a private carrier, but keep a door open to the public INSALUD through 
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double insurance. In such a case, the intuition would be that individuals with double insurance would 
llse the INSALUD facilities for "serious health problerns" (requiring the intensive use of high 
lechnology devices) and the private carriers for mild treatments. In fact this is what the Association of 
Consurners has recently reported in its periodical joumal, on the basis of a delphy study and an opinion 
survey (OCU, 1995). Sorne individuals are more susceptible ofbeing double insured than others. For 
instance, a typical case of double coverage would be that of a civil servant's partner who is covered by 
the Social Securíty general systern through hislher job in the prívate sector, and applies simultaneously 
10 MUFACE in order to becorne beneficiary (through hislher partner). In such a case, this kind of 
households optirnizes its choice by selecting a private carrier in MUFACE (the general Social Security 
systern does not ofTer any choice set). Another typical example is represented by the descendants of 
civil servants, once they enter the prívate job market and get covered by the general system of the 
Social Security. In such a case, unless they explicitly renounce to MUFACE, they rnay becorne 
doubled insured. 
Not only does MUFACE records flaw because of ignoring utilization and cost information but 
a1so because they do not inelude information on double insurance. \Ve have tried to overcome this 
second flaw by using t:wo other data sets: the Household Budget Survey (the HBS) and the NationaI 
Survey on Health (NSH). Both data sets corroborate the relevance ofdouble insurance. 
11tH THE HBS: ANOTHER RED FLAG ON DOUHLE INSURANCE. 
One of the main advantages of the HBS as compared to the data reported by MUFACE is its 
inclusion of wide information on al! the mernbers of the family: their age,sex, education leve1, 
professional status and, very specially, health care coverage information. 
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1,699 families reported to have sorne membercovered by MUFACE. \Ve selected a series 
of explanatory va~iables grouped according to three criteria: variables determining health care needs, 
vañables related to the supplied options, and variables related to income and education. 
Table 1 reports the result ofthe regression analysis. The second colurnn oftable 1 ineludes the 
estimates ofall explanatory variables mentioned before, the third colurnn ineludes the estimates ofonly 
those variables that shown sorne significance. The explained variable is the probability ofchoosing the 
public INSALUD provider. Positive coefficients mean that a given variable is associated with a higher 
probability of preferring the public lNSALUD provider. The colurnn labeled marginal probability 
("Mg. Prob.") represents the partial derivative ofthe regression equation. It evaluates the influence of 
one variable taking a certain value, moving from the reference cell and keeping the rest of variables 
unchanged, on the probability of choosing lNSALUD. This derivative was evaluated at the sample 
mean leve] of the regression equation. Finally, sorne information is provided in the last lines of the 
table about the percentage ofcorrect predictions succeeded by the modeI. 
[Table 1, here] 
The most important result is the strong influence of double insurance in the probability of 
choosing private carriers. This variable gets the value of one when a member of the family reported 
being MUFACE's beneficiary and, at the same time, having access to the general regime of the Social 
Security (necessarily provided by INSALUD). Those who paya complementary private health 
insurance are associated with a higher probability of choosing INSALUD. This would be consistent 
with the idea of choosing a provider in MUFACE such that the possibility of having access to both 
public and private health care remains open. 
In general, most variables related to health care need do not seem to have a strong relationship 
with the probability of choosing INSALUD. Having any retired member in the family is associated 
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with a greater probability ofchoosing a prívate provider. The sign of this relationship is consistent with 
the loyalty towards private carriers descríbed in previous paragraphs. 
There is no c1ear relationship between town size and the choice of a provider. In sorne areas of 
Spain, public health care services were rather scarce until recently. Traditionally, in those areas, people 
would get covered paying an annual fee to the rural physician or local insurance companies 
" 
("igualas"). These are now being sub-contracted by larger carriers that deal with MUFACE. In other 
towns, the presence of prívate insurers is so weak that this options is almost inexistent. There seems to 
be no general rule. 
In sorne Autonomous Communities, like Madrid and Catalunya, with an important private 
health care sector, the probability ofchoosing INSALUD is higher than in Andalucia. Andalucía is the 
reference Community for its being the most representative of national preferences. This result is 
coherent with tIle disparity between prívate sector relevance and geographic differences in the choice of 
provider described in previous research (Pellisé 1996). 
Finally, ¡ncome and education have little and unclear relatíonship with the choice ofhealth plan 
in MUFACE. 
III.C THE NSH: AN EXPLORA TORY ANAL YSIS OF HEALTH INDICATORS 
A1\"D THE CHOICE OF HEALTH INSURANCE CARRIER IN MUFACE. 
The National Survey on Health (NSH), run in 1993, should help us improve our understanding 
ofrisk se1ection in MUFACE in two senses. Firstly, by including quite detailed indicators on health 
status, Jife styles and habits, health care services utilization and demographic characteristics. And, 
secondly, by including information on the type ofhealth care coverage, and, more important, on double 
25 

insurance. The NSH reports the answers of more than 21,000 individuals sampled on a stratified 
fashion, representing the national territory. Among these interviewed individuals, 956 have declared to 
be MUFACE enrollees. 
However, the NSH has a limitation that should be kept in mind along this part of our analysis. 
On the one hand, the choice of insurance carrier is a family one. On the other hand, the survey is 
individual. The hypothesis of risk selection states that bad risks will tend to choose the public carrier 
INSALUD. More precisely, given the choice procedure of MUFACE, one should say that those 
famiJies, among whose members at least one is abad risk, wiII tend to choose the public INSALUD. 
However, the NSH ¡neludes individual indicators. Consequently, we might find , for example, that a 
sampled good risk might have chosen INSALUD, just because one of the members of hislher family 
(about whom \Ve have no inforrnation) is abad risk. This inconsistency between the implicadon ofthe 
choice of carrier and the inforrnation captured by the survey may bring a rather important amount of 
noise in our analysis. Van de Ven and Van Vliet (1995) faced a similar problem in a comparable 
context on choice of insurer. 
IIte.1 Variables eh osen for the analysis. 
The question related to ¡nsurance coverage included in the NSH ofTered a closed Iist of items 
representing different coverages. In broad terrns, this list ofTered four basic kinds of alternatives that 
could be he1pful to us: 
A. The WFACE special regime ofthe Social Security, with health care services provided by 
the public INSAL UD; 
B. The WFACE special regime ofthe Social Security, with health care services provided by a 
privare carrier; 
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C. The general regime of the Social Security, with services compuIsorily provided by the 
public INSALUD; 
D. Out-of-pocket complementary health insurance policy, contracted in the private health 
inslIrance mar/reto 
Individuals had the possibility of choosing a combination of these coverage including up to 
four of them simultaneously. For example, an individual could choose option A, or, altematively, A 
and B (A+B), or, as well, A, B, C and D (A+B+C+D). The focus of our analysis are those reporting at 
least options A or B or A+B. The possibility of choosing more than one coverage made the 
c1assification of individuals according to their coverage more complex than in the NSH. 
The combinatíon of MUFACE coverage and the remaining options C and D, yields a 
frequency table Iike that presented in Table 2. 
ITable 2, here] 
As in the National Household Budget Survey of 1991, this table testifies ofthe importance of 
double (and even triple) insurance coverage. According to this table, 24% ofMUFACE enrollees have 
more than one type of insurance policy, in spite ofthese policies covering basically the same health 
1 
1 
care services8• This percentage equals just 5% when we consider the whole NSH sample. Thus,I! :"i 
MUFACE enrollees tend to have much more double insurance than the rest of Spaniards. Moreover, 
among those 24% of MUFACE enrollees, 92% have double insurance funded by the Social Security 
ilSelf. And 59% ofthis latter group ofenroIlees have access to two kinds ofproviders (both reimbursed 
by the Social Security), private and public, simultaneously. 
Reported double insurance may reflect rmud, compatibility of part-time jobs with difTerent 
insurance policies, questionnaire mispecifications andlor answering mistakes. A three-hundred-page~ 
aSome items like onhopaedic prothesis and lens are bener covered when a pñvate carrier is chosen within MUFACE. 
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long report on this aspect of the survey, requested by the Spanish Ministry of Health to the public 
institution responsible for the survey (CSIC, 1994), lives room for all those possible explanations. 
These figures are quite consistent with those found with the HBS in our previous researches. The most 
impor&ant impact of this double insurance process, as far as we are concemed in this anaIysis, deals 
with the definítion of the variable "insurance coverage". Taking into account that our interest Hes 
main1y on the choice between prívate and public carrier, but consideríng that double insurance might be 
relevant, two variables have finally been defined. 
The first variable concems the choice of a private carrier within MUFACE options. It is 
labeled Y*, and has two categoríes. Category YPRIV ineludes those individuals covered by MUFACE 
and choosing a prívate carrier, independently ofdouble coverage9• Category YPUB ineludes the rest of 
individuals, Le. the MUFACE enrollees not choosing any publiely funded prívate carrier. \Ve will Iater 
on come back to these categories to make the distinction more meaningfuL 
The second variable places more emphasis on double insurance and is related to the kinds of 
providers an individual may actually have access too This variable is labeled PROV*, and has four 
categoríes. 
PROVPU ineludes those individuals who have exclusivety access to the public provider 
INSALUD, and not to any private provider. 
COMPLE ¡neludes those choosing the INSALUD in MUFACE, and having paid, 
simultaneously, for complementary coverage in the prívate insurance market. 
PROVPV ¡neludes those choosing a prívate carrier in MUFACE, and havíng no access to the 
public provider INSALUD, through neither ofthe Social Securíty regimes. 
9 Variable Y"lakes!he vaJue ypruv ifa MUFACE enrollee chooses a private camer e\'en ifhe!she says 10 have sorne o!her kind ofinsurance policy 
that iÍ\<es himlher access 10 INSSllNSALUD. 
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SUSTrr ¡neludes those choosing a private carrier through MUFACE, keeping simultaneously 
their access to INSALUD, through any ofthe regimes ofthe Social Security. 
The variable PROV· is nested by variable Y·. Category YPUB aggregates both categories 
PROVPU and COMPLE. And category YPRlV groups PROVPVand SUsrff. Table 3 shows the 
relationship between those two variables and categories defined by Table 2. 
[Table 3, here] 
An important inforrnation from this table is the proportion ofthose preferring a prívate carríer 
within MUFACE (43.2%) versus those preferring the INSALUD (the remaining 56.8%). These 
proportions equal 43.2 and 56.8 per cent, respectively. Meanwhile, these percentages are around 15 
and 85 in the MUFACE population (MUFACE, 1994). Thus, that table does not seem to represent the 
population in terrn of relative preferences. This same discrepancy appeared in the data resulting forrn 
the HBS mentioned earlier. In that case, the percentages were equal to 54 and 46, respectivelylO. 
Besides insurance coverage variables, the survey collected a quite wide variety of information 
re1ated to Jife style, heaIth status and services utilization. \Ve selected a set of them, tl)'ing to make the 
statistical analysis manageable. In fact, sorne variables were meaningless for our purposes, or had ex-
ante little relevance in explaining health care costs. Sorne questions were rather redundant. And sorne 
yielded too many missing or extreme values. A preliminary analysis of the data, ineluding initial 
mappings from MCA, the review of descriptive inforrnation published by the authors of the survey' I 
(Aréval0, et a1., 1994) and sorne unavoidable degree of discretionarity, helped us selecting variables 
and grouping categories. Grouping of categories, if any, \Vas made according to medica! and cost 
JOWe fonnally requested the Nationallnstitute ofStatistics that they explain this discn:pancy. and no answer has)-el been received 
JIAs an lllustrnti\"e case, the design of inter.a1s for the variable age was that used by the authors in their descripti\"e anaIysis. Those aged 17 was a 
alegO!)' on its o\\n, because indi\'iduals of thal age sho\\n specitic utilization patterns. Al !he hospital utilization leve~ their length of stay was, on 
a\'erage 102 days. whereas tha! ofthe immediate superior interval was 7.7 days. 
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criteria. Annex 3 summarizes the results of this process. Labels of categories appear in extensive and 
abbreviated form, and have no ordinal meaning. 
III.C.2 The rnethodology eh osen ror our ana1vsis ortbe data. 
An appropriate model on the choice of insurance carrier by MUFACE enrollees is one built on 
the grounds of individual choice theoretical models. Their formatization requires that a vector of 
characteristics of different insurance carriers be quantified. We have not been able to reach such a 
quantification. In such circumstances, the immediate alternative usually proposed (pudney, 1990) is to 
estímate an ad-hoc discrete regression equation on the choice of camer and some individual 
characteristics on the demand side. However, the important proportion of discrete variables in the 
questionnaire and the wide variety of items collected by the survey made multipIe correspondence 
analysis (MCA) desirable, at least as a first explorative stagel2• 
MCA does not try to establish any causal relationship between a set of variables. In fact, this 
feature is shared with any ad-hoc regression model. Moreover. in spite ofjust being nn exploratory 
too1, MCA has turned out to be more c1arífying than some alternative probit regression estimates. Table 
4 presents the results of a probit model based on the NSH13• A reason for that might be the special 
I2MCA is extensively used in marketing research. Buchmuller, Currlm and Abramson (1995) have recentIy presented a research on the choice of 
heaI!h plan using !his kind ofmodel. 
13 The explained variable is the probabUity of MUFACE enroDees not choosing a private canier (the probability ofY*cYpub). Two equations arc 
estimated, differentiate whether or not !he)' include explanatory variables related f.O double coverage. In none ofthe equations !he h}-pothesis that most 
categories have no influence on !he probability ofchoosing the public INSALUD, when compared f.O the probabDity ofthe reference category. cannot 
be rejected. Two categories seem f.O be a common exception in bo!h models. Having sorne relatively mM heal!h prob1em (versus no! having any) and 
using sorne heal!h can: services nO! intensively (versus no! using them al all) ma)' significantIy inercase !he probabnity ofchoosing a private carrier by 
10.8"10 and 16.4%respectively. These results are, by the \\'ay, consisten! wi!h !hose found in our f1l'St biplo! interpretation ofthe MeA anaIysis offered 
befare. But, besides !he relevance ofthese two categories, !he rnoS! importan! result is !he role played by double insurance in !he choice ofcarrier. 
Hence, as previous researches, !he regression model does not bring much light on risk selection processes, but places specjal emphasis on double 
msurancc. 
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ability of MCA to explore more than t\Vo categorical variables and synthesize the information on a 
two-dimensional scatterplot. Sorne other reasons might be found in the wide.amount of indicators that 
had to be used as explanatory variables, and the existence of strong multicolineality and interactions 
amongst them. 
[Table 4, here] 
, 
We have mainly tried to follow Michael J. Greenacre's manual (Greenacre, 1993) on 
correspondence analysis to build our own analysis. Afraid ofour distorting his manual, in annex 4 we 
introduce sorne ofhis concepts on correspondence analysis that \Ve wiU be referring to later on in our 
research. Annex 4 also reviews the specificities ofthe procedure we have followed for our MCA. 
Multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) is "the more conventional approach to analyzing 
multivariate data by correspondence analysis, specially when there is a large number of variables. In 
MCA all associations amongst pair of variables are analyzed as well as each association between a 
variable and itse1f." (Greenacre, 1993, p.141). Non surprisingly, the starting point ofMCA is a multiple 
contingency table inc1uding frequencies among active variables. 
Table 5 provides that information. The absolute off-diagonal, diagonal, and rowand column 
total frequencies of the actives variables constitute the Burt matrix, denoted B. \Ve have added to it a 
set ofrows and columns for the supplementary variable PROV*. 
[Table 5, here] 
lIle.3 Displav and interpretation ofthe results. 
The right hand columns ofTable 6 display the main statistical results of adjusted MCA. The 
first two principal axes (K=1,2), after adjusting, account for 63.5% of total inertia. This means that 
36.5% ofvariation is lost by projecting the Burt matrix information onto two axes. 
'. 
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[Table 6, here] 
Table 6 also reports the main results ofMCA from the indicator matrix (SAS output) and from 
the Burt matrix. As expected, total inertia from Z is much higher than in the rest of cases, while the 
percentage of inertia is lower. . 
Table 7 gives the principal coordinates of both axes for all categories, according to those three 
estimation methods.lt also ¡neludes vertices corresponding to variables y* and PROV*. the first being 
active and the latter supplementary, wiII be later on used for asyrnmetric mapping. 
[Table 7, here] 
A first elementary approach to try to understand the results of MCA is plotting the adjusted 
MCA coordinates reported in table 7. Then, one would try to give a conceptual name to each principal 
axis (K=J and K=2), by interpreting the positions ofsome set ofpoints, relative to that ofanother set of 
points. Figure 3 displays this (asyrnmetric) map, with vertices for the active variable y* and for the 
supplementary categories included in variable PROV*, . and with the rest of categories in profile 
points. 
[Figure 3, here} 
But, more clarifying than that asymmetric mapping, there exists a biplot interpretation of 
MCA. As explained in annex 4, vertices positions may be rescaled to conform a biplot interpretation of 
the results.in this way simplifies the interpretation of profile points drawn onto the map. For example. 
figure 4 displays the calibrated biplot axis of categories Ypub (choosing the public INSALUD in 
MUFACE) and Ypriv (choosing a private carrier), of the active variable Y*. When crossing the 
centroid (marked with a cross in Figure 4), the biplot axis takes the value ofthe average profile (55.1 % 
for YPllb and 44.9% for YPriv). Now, the estimated profiles ofthe other categories can be read off by 
projecting their positions perpendicularly onto these biplot axes. So, for example. if one projected 
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categol)' sa/u2 (point s2, "feeling well"), on to the calibrated biplot axis of Ypub (the straight line 
crossing point YPub and the centroid) would take the value +1.57%. This values is an approximate 
value of the distance between the average profile of those choosing the public INSALUD (equal to 
55,1%) and the specific profile ofthose choosing the public INSALUD under category salu2.ln other 
words, MCA makes an estimate profile equal to 56.67% for categories salu2 in Ypub. Similar to that 
" 
estimated through MCA, the observedfrequency ofsuch categol)' has the value 57.05% (55.1+1.95). 
[Figure 4, here] 
For the sake ofthe interpretation ofthe results obtained, we use a biplot interpretation like that 
offigure 4. However, while that one relates to categories Ypub and Ypriv, we will rather proceed on the 
grounds ofmore desegregated plots, based on categories nested by Ypub and Ypriv, subsequently. 
1. Supplcmentary catcgories ncstcd by l'priv. \Ve will concentrate on individuals choosing a 
prívate carrier first. Were sen'ice selection fully efTective, in terms of positive rents for private 
providers, double insured individuals choosing a private carrier in MUFACE would tend to show 
"unhealthier indicators" than singled insured (by a private carrier). Figure 5 displays the calibrated 
biplot axes of PROVpv and SUST/T. Note that the weighted average of both axes would produce the 
calibrated biplot axis of Ypriv drawn in Figure 4. This latter axis has been omitted here for simplicity, 
but the reader should keep in mind that it would be located somewhere in between both axis 
represented in Figure 5. 
[Figure 5, here] 
A first glance at this figure seems to show that enrollees having access to INSALUD are 
"healthier" and younger than those having exclusively access to prívate carriers. Thus, service 
selection could only be systematically practiced with relatively healthier individuals, specially ifhealth 
status is measured in terms ofthe age and absence of chronic diagnosed conditions. If it exists, service 
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selection is not providing private carriers in MUFACE with the maximum attainable rents. Two issues 
should be taken into account before taking further conclusions about service selection. 
Firstly, if true, that apparently stronger association between healthier related indicators and 
double insurance would not in any case imply that service selection may not be undertaken. It would 
just imply that, in case of being truly practiced, it would be among the youngest and healthiest 
individuals who choose a private carrier. 
Secondly, estimates of the distances of categories PROVpv and susrrr are associated with 
rather biased residuals against service selection, as shown in tables 8 and 9. The accuracy of this 
analysis should be questioned, and the analysis taken with sorne caution. Figure 6 splits observed 
distances from Ypriv into distances due to the group in PROVpv and distances due to the group in 
susrrr. This figure has been built using the raw distances shown in Table 8. For example, the 
observed distance of catego!)' utill from Ypriv equals 17.36, according to Table 8. Figure 6 displays 
this same distance as the sum oftwo forces: the distance ofutill from PROVpv average profile (7.70) 
and from susrrr average profile (9.66). According to Figure 6, two features are worth a comment. 
Firstly, categories related to getting elder are mostly associated with having a simple private provider, 
and younger individuals with double insurance. In fact, double insurance is most probably practiced by 
the working population. This would explain why elder are relatively more important in category 
PROVpv. Secondly, categories associated with "feeling bad due to accidental and mild reasons" are 
associated with double insurance. When compared to the average profile of those choosing a private 
provider (Ypriv), double insured are mainly individuals in working age intervals, feeling accidentally 
ve!)' bad with one hospitalization or less during the year previous to the survey, or with no more than 2 
outpatients visits during the fortnight previous to the interview, intensive sport keepers and hospitalized 
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women due to birth. Meanwhile. those choosing a private carrier with no double insurance are, when 
compared to the average profiles of individuals in Ypriv, too young to work or aboye 65 years old. 
[Tables 8 and 9. here] 
Summarizing, enrollees choosing a private carrier in MUFACE may be split into two groups, 
according to whether they are double insured and, also. according to their different health status and 
cace needs. The first group would include those having no double insurance and relatively elder 
(possibly with mobility problems). The second group ofenroIlees, one third of those choosing a prívate 
carrier, are middle aged with, if any, acute or unpredictable health problems. Only this latter group is 
susceptible ofgenerating service selection. 
[Figure 6, here] 
This biplot analysis has brought us some light about service selection. Amon!! those 
individuals choosing a prívate carrier, some groups in working age intervals seem to have more access 
to double insurance. So, service selection may hardly be undertaken among the elderly choosing a 
private carrier. since they are seldom double insured. More specifically, service selection may be 
undertaken among quite young individuals in working age intervals, those suffering from accidental 
health problems, implying the need for some acute services: feeling bad or very bad. requiríng one 
hospitalization (possibly obstetric services), or some outpatient services, having their activity Iimited by 
accidental health reasons (mild pains) and depression, and being quite intensive sport keepers. 
Sellón et al. (1994) analyzed the characteristics of double insured individuals in sorne area in 
Spain. and reached comparable results. They found out that heavy users ofpublic health care services, 
with prívate coverage as well, were mainly young individuals, belonging to a high socioeconomic 
class. facing mental problems such as anxiety, nerve strikes, period pain, stomach ache, menopause and 
bad circulation problems. 
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2. Supplementary categories nested by Ypllb. Figure 7 is the same display as Figure 5, now 
with calibrated biplot axes for categories PROVpu and COMPLE. The relationship we pointed out 
between figures 4 and 5 is now replicated between figures 4 and 7. In this latter case, the two axes 
corresponding to categories PROVpu and COMPLE (figure 7) yield a weighted averaged axis like that 
offigure 4 for Ypub. 
[Figure 7J 
The potential effect of service selection is somehow more evident among the group of 
MUFACE enrollees that have chosen the INSALUD. Among them, those having access exclusively to 
the public INSALUD (not double insured) show a stronger degree of association with indicators 
c10sely related to poor health status. Meanwhile, those who, having chosen INSALUD in MUFACE, 
acquire a complementa!)' health insurance on their own expenses, are better associated with some 
unpredictable acute or just mild health problem (susceptible ofgenerating frequent outpatient services). 
The residuals implied by the biplot interpretation of categories PROVpu and are no less 
important than those obtained by categories PROVpv and SUSTIT. However, the positive aspect about 
the residuals for Ypub supplementa!)' suh-categories is that their analysis does not lead to any 
modification ofour previous explorative conclusions. In fact, the analysis ofthe residuals exhibited in 
tables 8 and 9 exacerbates the potential ofservice selection by private carriers. 
As before, the biplot interpretation of MCA has brought some light on service selection. 
Among those choosing the public INSALUD, only the working youngest and generally healthiest 
contract a complementary health insurance policy in the prívate market: feeling well, aged under the 
30s, needing at most one hospitalization along the year previous to the interview or a couple of 
outpatients visits, smokers and occasional sport keepers. In contrast, those having only access to 
INSALUD have chronic conditions unrelated to aging (diabetes, asthma, bronchitis,...), are the 
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I ­ heaviest health care users (more than two hospitalizations in a year), are intensive sport keepers, 17 
years oId or not as young as those having complementar:y insurance, but neither as old as those 
choosing a prívate carrier. 
Table 10 summarizes these most important associations between categories of active and 
supplementar:y variables. These biplot interpretations of active protiles and supplementar:y categoríes 
are quite consistent with intuition and the oeu study (OeU,1995), about private carriers marketing 
their policies among individuals who just need mild instead of high technology demanding treatments. 
[Table 10, here] 
The consequences ofthis marketing differentiation come as follows: whenever access costs (in 
tenns of\vaiting lists, location, choice ofphysician, and so on) to primar:y care are lower in the private 
sector and technical quality is comparable in both sectors, then, heavy outpatient services users will 
1end to choose a private provider. 
This same kind ofdecision results in the choice ofhealth plan by American employees. In their 
case, different access costs from one plan to another take the form of deductible, stop-Iosses and 
premiums. The result is a similar self-selection process. For example, Ellis (1985) demonstrates that 
prior-year hea1th expenditures have a substantial impact on health plan choice by employees of a firm: 
employees selecting the highest coverage option on average spent 5.4 times as much as employees in 
the lowest coverage option in the year prior to making their hea1th plan and 3.6 times as much in the 
year after making the plan choice. 
III.n SUMMARY OF THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS. 
The goal ofthe empirical analysis was to test the existence ofrisk selection by prívate carriers. 
The data gives no clear-cut idea about it, but corroborates quite satisfactorily some of the intuitions and 
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theoretical features stated in previous steps ofthis research. A first exploration ofthe data (from any of 
the sources used) seemed to show that private carriers were dealing with the elder, and hence, the 
unhealthiest enrollees of MUFACE. But further steps of our analysis, basically by means of MCA, 
helped us elicit some ideas about risk and service selection: 
(i) Risk selection is not undertaken according to aging criteria. The elder appear to have 
chosen, in a greater degree, a private carrier in the MUFACE system. Possible rational for that may be 
found in either service selection or the inheritance ofMUFACE choice structure as designed before the 
70s. 
* On the one hand, service selection among the elder does not seem to be a potential source of 
rents for private carriers, since this anafysis shows that double insurance is not one of the 
characteristics ofthis groups ofenroflees. 
* On the other hand, the inherited past history of MUFACE may explain the relative 
preference of the elder for prívate carriers. Before MUFACE \Vas set up, civil servants and 
their dependents had health services provided by private carriers exclusively. This group of 
Spaniards did not have access to INSALUD, through any regime of the Social Security. 
Moreover, MUFACE was forma))y structured at the end ofthe seventies, and the INSALUD 
was never contracted by MUFACE until some years latero Given this Iater participation of 
INSALUD in the MUFACE system, then, loyalty may expIain the elder 
individuaIs'preferences for private providers. 
Moreover, it may be hard for private carriers to skim out the e\derIy since, besides 
appreciating loyalty, the CIRES (1994) study showed that the e\derIy make up one of the 
groups that more emphasis places on some perceived aspects of quality of care like good 
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personal treatment. These and other aspects ofthe amenities are the most important differential 
characteristic ofprivate providers when compared to the public INSALUD. 
(ii) Even though risk selection does not seem to be undertaken by aging related conditions, the 
data shows that it may be driven by other criteria and by the means of service selection (double 
insu~ce). 
* Indeed, intensive hospital and outpatient health care users (lItil2 and aged 17) andlor 
individuals with chronic conditions not cIosely related to aging (diabetes, allergies, asthma, 
bronchitis,...) have exclusively access to the INSALUD. The much lower presence of these 
kind of individuals in private carriers may testify to risk selection. 
* Light and medium health care users (utilJ), with their activity recently limited by mental or 
mild accidental problems, young in working age intervals andlor very intensive sport keepers 
are bener associated with double co\'erage (publicly or privately funded), and susceptible of 
being targeted on for service selection. 
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CONCLUSIONS. 
This research has tried to contribute to the understanding of capitated payrnents in a context 
of managed cornpetition among insurance carriers or equivalent providers. This kind of regulated 
cornpetition is in the heart of actual debates about the future of our health care systern in Spain. And 
" 
the reasons for these rnarkets being so relevant in Spain are rnainly the influence of the debates and 
reform proposals in the rest of closer developed countries, as well as the controversial a natural 
experiment ofrnanaged cornpetition nowadays existing in Spain: the MUFACE. 
Following a description of MUFACE's managed cornpetition, two sections constitute the 
core of this research. One includes a formalization of MUFACE regulatory environment and of its 
implications in terms of the incentives generated. The other section inc1udes sorne empirical effort 
towards the assessrnent of sorne of the results found along the formalization. 
Sorne of the results found along the formalization of MUFACE's reimbursernent 
arrangernents are that, frrstly, effort exerted by insurers equals the frrst-order optimal level under 
complete information conditions. Secondly. the rnagnitude of the capitation payrnent is one of the 
potential flaws detected in MUFACE's reimbursement systern. Thirdly, pre-contractual selection (of 
insurers dealing with MUFACE) is bound to occur if risks vary exogenously across insurers. And. 
fma11y. post-contractual risk selection (of enrollees) might also be observed if insurers are able 10 
"sklln the cream" and the reimbursernent scherne is prospective. 
Part of MUFACE problems related to the incentive scherne may be solved by blending the 
capitation with cost reimbursement. That is. by offering additional types of contracts that are blended 
with sorne rneasure of observed costs. 
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However. this fonnalization should be treated with caution because it does not account for 
some important elements of the MUFACE system. Among others, we have not analyzed the 
dynamics of the contractual system, insurers' competition, aspects of quality of care and output 
measurement, the role of economies of scale and scope in the insurers'marketing strategy, and 
transaction costs of enrollees when switching plans. In spite of these flaws, we hope that our 
analysis might have open new doors to the focus of capitated payments, not only in the context of 
MUFACE and but also in many recent refonns under way in developed countries. 
The following section tried to test some of the results of the fonnalization, and more 
specially the existence of risk selection. When considering the empírical assessment of the existence 
of risk selection in MUFACE, one realizes that, in spite of a fonnalization of MUFACE that 
predicts risk selection in the system, refonners (and interest groups such as insurers) of the Spanish 
Health Care System stick to the argument that there is no risk selection in MUFACE. They illustrate 
this argument showing the distribution of enrollees according to the choice of private versus public 
carriers, by age and sexo Indeed theír figures contradict any hypothesis of risk selection in 
MUFACE, given the generally accepted positive correlation between health expenditure and aging: 
me elderly relatively prefer private plans. 
Our empírical analysis has tried to disentangle this contradiction, using a variety of data 
bases. Some very important lessons may be taken. 
1. FJrstly, our analysis proves how difficult it is in general to assess risk selection. 
Moreover, this difficulty gets worse in the case of MUFACE due to some institutional specificities, 
like me inextence of a private provider (lNSALUD) until 1977. Consequently, unless an analysis of 
hea1th plan switchers only is undertaken, any other analysis of MUFACE will yield lower estimates 
of risk selection. Analyzing all enrollees in MUFACE, without knowing who has recently switched. 
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who switches that year, who is an enrollee since 1977 or before (when the INSALUD became an 
optional health plan for the frrst time), and so on, does not help assessing risk selection. 
Our analysis has captured the weight of history in the data, and how it determines risk 
selection: the majority of the elder stay in private companies due to loyalty. The effect of this weight 
of history on MUFACE should be mterpreted taking two issues into account: Firstly. MUFACE 
history makes risk selection hard to assess from the general data. This does not mean though that the 
hypothesis of risk selection should be rejected. By skirnming only the highest one percent spenders 
of the elderly, an insurance carrier may save around 25% of íts costs. Secondly, this weight of 
history lowers with time. So, this same MUFACE system, with the same options as now and the 
same incentives, may yield very different results in the future. 
2. A more sutil alternative to risk selection has been detected. We have called it sen'ice selection. It 
consists in making profit out of double insured enrollees, those who choose a private carrier in 
MUFACE, but manage to simultaneously keep their access to the INSALUD through any regime of 
the Social Security. With double insurance, enrollees may use privately provided services for mild 
health problems only (outpatient services) and publicly provided services for more serious health 
problems. Consequently, private carriers will not mind accepting high risk individuals, at very low 
health care costs for them. Indeed, they know that probably the INSALUD will have to deal with the 
expensive part of the health care of these patients. A regular data base like that of MUFACE fIles 
does not offer information on double insurance. We have been able to disentangle the effect of 
double insurance and risk selection on the grounds of two national surveys: that on the Household 
Budgets and that on Health indicators. 
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ANNEX 1: SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS FOR A MAXIMUM UNDER 
HETEROGENEOUS RISK POOLS 
The second derivative ofthe net transfer equals 
., 2 2O'U/or] = o{oU/Ord/Or] 
= O(p[(Ucr).(~/(Jl)] + e~2/<1> - crt;la).[J + e<1> -p]} /or/ 
= -p(U<l>cr2) (t;¡{a) + (~/<1>/]- ~elcr {J - t;¡{a).{t;¡{a).(<1>/~/-J]+ a~/<1>} 
=> ¡jU/or/ ~ O, 
given that 
, 	 <1> > O, 

~ > O, and 

0< t;la) < J. 

This non positivety ensures that the utility function is quasi-concave with regard to r¡. 
Hence. the solution offered by equation (28) is a maximwn. 
These conditions may be extended to the case where the net transfer does not imply a fully 
prospective payment scheme. In such a case, where the net transfer becomes 
where b (05:b<J), the second derivative becomes 
¡jU/~r/ = - p(I/(Jxl) (c.,¡(a) + (9/<1>/]- ~belcr {J - t;¡{a).[t;¡{a).(<1>/~/-J]+ +a~/<1>} 
=> O' u/ar/::; o. 
ANNEX 2: CONDITIONS FOR THE UNBINDING CONSTRAINT UNDER 
HETEROGENEITY OF RISK POOLS. 
The constrrun we imposed to the program is 
cr A¡{a) [1 + E4:J ­ p}'C:.p [(l-4:J)I4:J) I. (A3.1) 
The unconstrained first-order conditions ""ith respect to r¡ is, 
(A3.2) 
Qiven equation (16) and the property of the hazard functions (a + $14:J) > 0, this 
unconstrruned first-order condition implies that 
(A3.3) 
For that stationary point of the utility function exist under the constrrun area, it suffices 
that the right hand side of equation (A3.3), which equals the left-hand-side of equation (A3.1) at 
the stationary point, is greater thanp [(l-4:J)I4:J) 1, from equation (A3.l). 
(p[(Ucr).($14:J2)} + E$214:J} I (a + $14:J) > p [(l-4:J)I4:J! 1 
<=> pI[(l-4:J)I4:J}[a + $14:J) < p [(llcr).($14:J2)} + E$ 14:J, 

<=> pI[$I4:J - (1-4:J)($a+4:J)}+ crEf > ° 
<=> pI (l-4:J)($I4:J) [ J + (l-4:J);la)} > 0, (A3A) 
which a1ways happens when 
p> 0, 
1> 0, 
4:J> 0, 
and $ > O. 
In other words, inequality (A3A) ,.,ill be true whenever the disutility ~(r¡) ofselecting is positive. 
ANNEX 3: VARIABLES AND CATEGORlES OF MCA. 
SALU*= 	 How do you perceive your health status? 
SI = SALUl Very good. 

S2 = SALU2 Good. 

S3 = SALU3 So-so. 

S4 = SALU4 Bad or very bad. 

CRONI*= Have you been diagnosed any chronic condition? (listed conditions) 
" CO=CRONIO No. 

CH=CRONIl Yes, related to heart, hypertension or cholesterol problems. 

CD=CRONI2 Yes, related to diabetes, asthma, bronchitis, stomach ulcer, 

allergies, or other. 
Did you need to limit your main work or leisure activities due to any disease 
or pain? (listed diseases and pains) 
LO = LIMO No. 

LD=LIMDEP Yes, due to depression, nerves strikes or poor sleeping. 

LP=LIMDOL Yes, due to common pains, such as headaches, cough, flu, 

fever, ear pain, period pain, throat problems or fatigue. 
LH=LIMOTR Yes, due to other reasons, such as those related to heart,liver, 
stomach, blood pressure, joints or lung. 
UTIL*= 	 Have you used outpatient services along the last fortnight, or inpatient 
sen'ices along the past twelve months? 
UO = UTILO Not inpatient services and no more than one outpatient visito 
VI = UTILl One short stay in hospital (less than 8 days) or/and more than one 
outpatient visit, exc1uding birth reasons,. 
U2 = VTIL2 	 One long stay in hospital (8 days or more) and/or more than one stay 
in hospitallast year, with or without outpatient services utilization, and 
excIudíng birth reasons ofhospitalization. 
UP = UTILP 	Any hospitalization, with or without outpatient visits, due to birth. 
VIE*=Those aged 65 or more, were asked to rate their ability to undertake sorne activities in 
a scale from one to three. Twenty-seven kinds ofactivities were calibrated. 
These activities were mainly ofthree kinds: basic needs (eat, dress up, have a 
shower, ...), domestic activities ( wash up, clean up,... ) and mobility (walk, 
take a bus, climb up stairs,...). Each ofthe items was calibrated in a scale of 
one ("can do the activity without any help"), two ("can do it with sorne help") 
or three ("cannot do it at aH"). The variable VIE* is a categorical variable 
based on the overall average of the scores resulting from the calibration of 
those 27 items. 
VO=VIEO Those aged under 65 or rating zero in all items. 

VI =VIEI Those rating more than zero but less than two. 

V2=VIE2 Those rating two or more. 

EJFIS*= How much sport do you practice during your leisure time? 
El = EJFIS1 None. 

E2 = EJFIS2 Occasionally (sorne activities requiring minimum effort). 

E3 = EJFIS3 Regularly (sorne sport more than once a month). 

E4 = EJFIS4 Seriously (sorne sport more than once a week). 

FUM*= Do you smoke? 
FS = FUMS Occasionally or usually. 

FN = FUMN Never. 

SEX= 	H=HOM Man. 
M=MUJ Woman. 
AGE= 17 = EDA17 Aged 17. 
20 = 17-24 Aged [18,24]. 
30 = 25-44 Aged [25,44]. 
50 =45-64 Aged [45,64]. 
70 = 65-74 Aged [65,74]. 
75 = 75 0+ Aged 75 or more. 
Y*= Choice of insurance carrier within MUF ACE. 
YPUBL INSALUD. Note that this category inc1udes both PROVPU and 

COMPLEM as defined by the variable PROV*. 

YPRIV A prívate insurance carrier. Note that this category inc1udes both 

PROVPV and SUSTIT as defined by the variable PROV*. 
PROV*= Provider the individual may have access to, according to hislher public and private 
coverage. 
PROVPU INSALUD has been chosen, and the individual has no other privately 
financed coverage. 
COMPLE INSALUD has been chosen, but the individual is, simultaneously, 
privately paying for a private health insurance coverage. 
PROVPV The individual has chosen a private carrier within the MUF ACE 
system, and has no access to the INSALUD. 
SUSTITThe individual has chosen a private carrier within the MUF ACE system, but 
has simultaneously access to the INSALUD by double public 
coverage, either through MUF ACE or the general regime of the Social 
Security. 
ANNEX 4: AN OVERVIE\V OF MCA AND THE SPECIFICITIES OF OUR 
ANALYSIS. 
« An overview ofMCA. 
Correspondence analysis offers the possibility ofsummarizing multi-dimensional 
data by means of a two-dimensional graphical representation. The starting point of 
correspondence analysis is a contingency table amongst a set of categorical data. The 
comparison of relative frequencies (projiles) of each category against the rest of categories 
with the corresponding row or column masses (average projiles) are used to obtain chi­
squared statistic measures ofdiscrepancies. These chi-squared distances constitute the basic 
tool for identifying a subspace with lower dimensions, usually two, than the original 
conting~ncy tableo It then projects the profiles points onto such a sub-space. 
An important concept of correspondence analysis is the inerlia, which quantifies the 
amount of variation accounted for by the correspondence principal axes (Greenacre, 1984). 
The inertia ofa contingency table is the Chi-squared statistic divided by the total of the tableo 
It can also be interpreted as the weighted average of Chi-squared distances between profiles 
and masses. If the subspace has two dimensions, a map with two principal axes results from 
the correspondence analysis. The accuracy, or quality, ofthe resulting display is measured by 
a quantity cal1ed the percentage ofinertia, corresponding to the sum ofthe percentage of 
total inertia that each of the axis is able to represent. 
The coordinate positions ofprofiles with respect to a principal axis are called 
principal coordina/es. They might be analyzed as an approximation to their true higher­
dimensional positions. Vertíces, unit profiles, may also be projected onto the optimal 
subspace, yielding standard coordinates. Vertices are unit profiles in the sense that their 
weighted sum of squares is equal to one, their weight being the masses (Greenacre, 1984). 
Vertices are exactIy equal to profile points divided by a scalingfactor for each axis. This 
scaling factor equals the singular vall/e, Le. the square root of the principal inertia along that 
axis. 
Correspondence analysis, besides a graphical interpretation tool of the contingency 
table~ provides optimal scales for the attributes in terms ofthe variance-maximizing criterion. 
A map with categories represented by their principal coordinates andlor standard 
coordinates may be obtained. When all categories are represented in their principal 
coordinates (or profile positions), we are building a symmetric map. When a set of categories 
are represented in standard coordinates and the rest in their profile position, we are building 
an asymmelric map. Asymmetric mapping might help the interpretation (Greenacre and 
Hastie, 1987) in two ways. Firstly, vertices might be used as reference points to interpret the 
spread ofprofiles. Secondly, given optimal scaling, vertices positions might be rescaled to 
conform to a biplot interpretation of the data. This rescaling means that vertices are pulled in 
towards the origin by an amount equal to the mass associated with the vertex category. Biplot 
axes are then built passing through rescaled vertices and the origino Finally, principal 
coordinates may be read directly off the map by projecting them on to the biplot axes. 
« MeA and SAS programming. 
We have carried out MCA with SAS Software. Consequently, although the more 
traditional MCA is based on the Burt matrix, the SAS procedure PROC CORRESP defines 
MCA in a slightly different way. SAS defines MCA as the analysis of a matrix which codes 
the original data in the form ofdummy variables. SAS builds a large matrix Zl, with as many 
rows as observations and as many columns as categories, consisting of zeros and ones. The 
ones in eaeh row indicate the responses in the appropriate eolumns (categories). Greenacre 
caIls this Z matrix an indicator matrix, sometimes it is eaIled a pseudocontingency tabIe 
(CarroIl, Green and Schaffer, 1987) and SAS manuals refer to it as a design matrix. 
The only effect of working with an indicator matrix is that the principal inertias 
resultingfrom it equal the square roots of those resulting from the analysis of a Burt matrix. 
Otherwise, the standard eoordinates are the same. Sorne authors (CarroIl, Green and 
Sehaffer, 1987) eonsider that performing MCA on an indicator matrix provides symmetric 
mapping with major interpretation advantages. However, sorne authors consider that this 
.approaeh may have sorne flaws (Greenacre, 1989). 
« MeA and adjusted MeA. 
MCA has sorne advantages: it is easy to implement and exeeute, and the resulting 
coordinates ofthe categories on the first principal axis provide an optimaI scale. However, it 
has also sorne disadvantages (Greenacre, 1993 and 1989) derived from the combination of 
both the off-diagonal and diagonal blocks of the Burt matrix. "The most apparent symptom 
of this problem is the faet that the total inertia in a MCA is generaIly high while the 
pereentage of inertia along the principal axes are invariably low. This gives the impression 
that the maps are poor displays of the data, whereas the real reason is the inability of the 
method to accurately display the diagonal bloeks." (Greenaere, 1993, p.143). 
Those are the reasons why we have tried to refine the results ofMCA. Following 
Greenacre's recommendations, each principal axis is rescaled ttso that the solution maps the 
associations in the off-diagonal blocks as accurately as it can."(Greenacre, 1993, p145). 
« Active and supplementarv variables. 
Variable y* was introduced as an active variable in the multiple correspondence 
anaIysis, while PROV* as a supplementary. The reasons for that are that, firstly, y* nests 
PROV* and is better balanced; Secondly, that PROV*, in spite ofbeingjust a 
supplementary variable, is still "useful in interpreting features discovered in the primary 
data" (Greenacre, 1993). 
• Greenacrc, 1993,module 17. 
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